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Abstract 
The balance of evidence available supports the conclusion that Clement of Alexandria endorsed the 
doctrine of reincarnation. He nowhere criticizes the tenet. Instead, he presents an undeniably 
positive evaluation of the doctrine. He quotes, without criticism, from within (and from passages 
close to) Plato’s accounts of reincarnation, and he employs Plato’s reincarnational language. In 
some passages, Clement probably on purpose gives the impression that he denounces the idea of 
reincarnation (or the pre-existence of the soul). However, reading him closely reveals other notions 
as the targets of his criticism. Reincarnation is in harmony with Clement’s views of anthropology, 
ethics, God’s punishments and salvation. There are significant points of contact with Philo’s 
reincarnational thought. The lack of an explicit statement on the doctrine by Clement should be seen 
against the background that it is more plausible to assume he hid an approving rather than a 
rejecting stance.  
_________________________ 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this essay is to present in a condensed form some of the major results of my research 
project on Clement of Alexandria’s position on the doctrine of reincarnation.1 Simultaenously to 
 
1  I gratefully acknowledge that the three-year project was funded by the Academy of Finland 
(decision nr. 294528 29.04.2016). I also thank the participants of the workshop on Clement at the 
18th International Conference of Patristic Studies, held in Oxford in August 2019 – Ilaria Ramelli 
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writing this article I am also writing a monograph on the subject. Although that work is not yet 
completed, the overall picture has already emerged clear: the available evidence is much better 
accounted for by assuming Clement endorsed reincarnation than by supposing he did not.  
The background of the project on Clement lies to a noteworthy degree in my findings on Philo of 
Alexandria’s stance on reincarnation.2 I found that stance to be one of endorsement, although the 
tenet is not something on which Philo wanted to write often and openly. In printed literature, Philo 
has been considered a supporter of the doctrine since the 1570s.3 I would call this the traditional 
view, questioned only in the 20th century, when scholars even began to speak of Philo’s ‘rejection’ 
of reincarnation.4 In the end, of all the references to the question in scholarly literature, I found 
Zeller’s to be the most accurate one: ‘Only after the separation from the body do those souls that 
have kept themselves free from dependence on the body again attain the undisturbed enjoyment of 
their higher life. On these grounds, only the nous, without the lower powers of the soul, participates 
in this life. As seldom as he speaks of it, for the other souls Philo posits the prospect of the 
transmigration of the soul, which was the necessary consequence of hise premises.’5  
 
and Jonathan Young in particular – for their useful comments on the version of this paper prepared 
for the Conference. 
2 For a revised and shortened version of my doctoral thesis on the subject, see Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, 
Reincarnation in Philo of Alexandria, Studia Philonica Monographs 7 (Atlanta, 2015). 
3 Azariah ben Moses de’ Rossi, The Light of the Eyes: Translated from the Hebrew with an 
Introduction and Annotations by Joanna Weinberg, Yale Judaica Series 31 (New Haven, 2001), 
113. De’ Rossi’s work (Me’or Enayim in Hebrew) was originally published in Mantua in 1573–5). 
4 See S. Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo (2015), 15–29. 
5 Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Hildesheim, 
6th ed., 1963), 3.2.446, originally published during 1844–1852. My translation for ‘Erst nach der 
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Philo’s locus classicus on reincarnation is Somn. 1.138–9 where he speaks of souls who are ‘lovers 
of the body (φιλοσώματοι) [and] descending to be fast bound in mortal bodies’.6 After being 
separated from the body at death, such souls, ‘longing for the familiar and accustomed ways of 
mortal life, hurry back again’ (παλινδρομοῦσιν αὖθις). The key driving force of reincarnation in 
Philo is the souls’ love for the corporeal in general and the body in particular; in the main, his view 
is very Platonic. The major differences from Plato are three: (1) being born as an animal is not an 
option, since, according to Philo, animals lack the νοῦς – the real human being in his view; (2) the 
role of God’s grace in salvation is more pronounced in Philo’s synergistic soteriology; (3) the 
doctrine is more esoteric; although Plato placed most of his discussions of reincarnation in the 
mythical parts of his dialogues – the Phaedo being the most important exception – he, nevertheless, 
put it in plain sight. 
Why investigate the same issue in Clement? There are some very good a priori reasons, which, it 
has to be emphasized, do not answer the question of what his position actually was. These reasons 
can be enumerated, e.g., as follows: (1) Clement’s Platonist orientation, which he probably held 
prior to becoming a Christian and which (in that case at least, and originally) very likely included a 
belief in reincarnation; (2) his appropriation and appreciation of Pythagorean and Philonic ideas; (3) 
the lack of an explicit statement concerning his own personal stance; (4) Clement’s avowed 
 
Trennung vom Leibe gelangen diejenigen Seelen, welche sich von der Anhänglichkeit an denselben 
frei erhalten haben, wieder zum ungestörten Genuss ihres höheren Lebens, an dem aus diesem 
Grunde nur der Nus, ohne die niederen Seelenkräfte, theilnimmt; den übrigen stellt Philo, so selten 
er auch davon redet, die Seelenwanderung in Aussicht, welche seine Voraussetzungen forderten.’ 
6 Translations from Philo are those in Loeb Classical Library with some modifications. 
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esotericism in the Stromateis;7 and finally, (5) the fact that he was accused by Patriarch Photius 
(Bibl. cod. 8) of endorsing the doctrine in the now lost Hypotyposeis.8 
Clement’s silence about his own position (point 3 above) merits some further comments. First, there 
is no scholarly consensus that it exists; instead, many researchers see Clement rejecting 
reincarnation (or the soul’s pre-existence) in certain passages. However, I maintain that a close 
reading of Clement does not bring up a single case of rejection.9 Second, why am I arguing from 
this silence that it may reflect approval? While arguments from silence cannot be decisive, they may 
be valid in cases where ‘we fail to find behavior that we would expect’.10 What one can reasonably 
‘expect’ is a matter of debate, but the openly hostile comments on reincarnation by other Christian 
authors in the second century (most notably Irenaeus, e.g., Adv. haer. 2.33 and Tertullian, e.g., De 
anima 23) make it probable that Clement would not have been under external pressure to hide a 
rejecting stance but an approving one. We know that he did have a stance; he implies this in at least 
 
7 E.g., Str. 1.1.5: ‘Sometimes [the Stromateis] will try … to reveal something without uncovering it 
or to demonstrate it without saying anything’. The translations from Str. 1–3 are Ferguson’s (in The 
Fathers of the Church) with occasional modifications. 
8 These charges have been recently discussed by Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria 
on Trial: The Evidence of ‘Heresy’ from Photius’ Bibliotheca, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 
101 (Leiden, 2010) who devotes one chapter to reincarnation. His conclusion concerning the verity 
of the charge is diametrically opposed to mine. 
9 It should be noted that, if need be, Clement had no difficulties in expressing a strong disapproval 
of others’ views; see, e.g., Str. 4.12.85.2, 7.14.88.5. 
10 James R. Royse, ‘Did Philo Publish His Works?’, SPhiloA 25 (2013), 75–100, 84. Royse gives as 
a classical example from literature a passage from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Silver Blaze, where 
Sherlock Holmes calls a dog’s not barking when it should have a ‘curious incident’. 
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two passages (Str. 3.3.13.3, 4.12.85.3). It is worth noting that on both occasions he says he will 
return to the matter, but he never does. 
Philo and Clement, while differing in several ways, have in common the fact that the investigation 
of their position on reincarnation cannot rely solely on the rare statements about the fate of the 
wicked after death, or concerning the doctrine itself; in Philo’s surviving works, we do not even 
have the latter. Thus, the student of the subject must, first of all, establish whether the tenet would 
have a niche in which to thrive in their thought. This means perusing, in particular, their 
anthropological, ethical, eschatological and soteriological views in order to assess if reincarnation is 
compatible or incompatible with their thinking. Both authors hid their truest thoughts on the tenet, 
but I argue that they did not want to hide them so well that they cannot be found. 
I approach the question of what Clement’s position on reincarnation was through what I understand 
to be the core of the scientific principle: theories that cannot explain our observations must be 
abandoned. This is fully applicable in historical research as well, for although we cannot carry out 
experiments on historical matters, we do make observations concerning our historical research data. 
In terms of methodology, my main method is the close reading of the source materials and their 
intertextual, tradition-historical, philosophical and linguistic analysis. 
What follows is a series of short presentations of selected aspects of the problem. Such a concise 
presentation as this is by necessity quite ‘Stromatean’ in its ‘passing constantly from one thing to 
another’ (Str. 4.2.4.1). It is difficult, in an article, to adequately summarize the argument of a book, 
especially of one that has not yet been fully written. I cannot analyse all of Clement’s references to 
reincarnation,11 and several complicated questions are discussed below much more briefly than they 
deserve. Here I can only refer to my forthcoming monograph. 
 





2. The Evidence 
I begin this brief discussion of the evidence with Clement’s clearest evaluation of the tenet of 
reincarnation and continue by discussing one of his techniques of concealment as well as his views 
on the soul’s pre-existence, the body, resurrection, the world, the passions, the prerequisites of and 
the alternative to salvation, punishments after death, the roles of Christ and divine grace. 
 
Among the Best Doctrines 
Clement’s most explicit appraisal of the doctrine of reincarnation reads as follows:  
We could find also another proof for validating the boasting (αὐχεῖν) of the best 
philosophers (τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν φιλοσόφων) to have appropriated (σφετερισαμένους) 
from us the best doctrines (τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν δογμάτων) as their own (ὡς ἴδια): the 
gathering not only from the other barbarians some things which contribute to each 
sect, but in particular [from] Egyptians both other things and the doctrine of the 
transmigration of the soul (τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν τῆς ψυχῆς δόγμα). (Str. 6.4.35.1)12 
In this remarkable statement, Clement singles out reincarnation as an example of the best doctrines 
that the best philosophers have stolen from the non-Greeks – in this case, ostensibly from the 
Egyptians. He characterises the tenet with the superlative of the adjective καλός, which means 
‘beautiful’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘noble’ etc.13 Even if this represents the philosophers’ self-assessment 
concerning which of their doctrines are the best ones,14 the evaluation concerning the philosophers 
 
12 My translation. 
13 LSJ. 
14 As suggested by Ilaria Ramelli in her response to the first version of this paper. 
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themselves as ‘best’ – the term now being ἄριστος, which serves as the superlative of ἀγαθός – is 
Clement’s own. Although the description of the doctrine is indirect, it remains, however, a positive 
one. The passage cannot be taken to reflect a negative or even neutral attitude towards the doctrine 
of reincarnation. 
Nevertheless, even here Clement refrains from explicitly stating whether he considers the doctrine 
to be true. Can we infer what he thinks? We know that Clement thought the Greek had ‘true 
doctrines’ (ἀληθῆ τινα δογματίζειν, Str. 1.19.91.1), and they ‘delivered a slice of true philosophy 
(τινα τῆς ἀληθοῦς φιλοσοφίας)’ (Str. 1.19.94.1).15 An assumption that one of their ‘best’ doctrines 
is not among the true ones would need to be argued for. However, there is no doubt that philosophy 
is not enough in Clement’s thought. It has its place as ‘preparatory education for the gnostic’, but it 
is not indispensable (Str. 1.20.99.1). Philosophy, ‘on its own, did bring the Greeks to righteousness, 
though not to perfect righteousness’ (99.3).  
Reading on, we encounter a close parallel to the above passage from book six. In Str. 1.20.100.4–5, 
Clement criticizes the Greek philosophers’ plagiarism using almost identical terminology: ‘Once 
again, he is unjust who appropriates ideas from barbarians and proudly puts them forward as one’s 
own (ὁ σφετερισάμενος τὰ βαρβάρων καὶ ὡς ἴδια αὐχῶν), puffing up one’s own reputation and 
playing false with the truth’. Clement does not mention any particular doctrine, but something 
precious is clearly implied to have been stolen. A specific tenet is mentioned in another parallel, in 
Str. 6.2, where too Clement mentions ‘the selfish plagiarism of the Greeks, and how they claim 
(σφετερίζονται) the discovery of the best of their doctrines (τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλλίστων δογμάτων), 
 
15 In the section Str. 1.19.91–4, with its quotations from the Phaedo and the Republic, Plato clearly 
acts as the yardstick of acceptable philosophy. Among Plato’s dialogues the Phaedo is the most 
explicitly reincarnational one. The tenet is there intimately linked to the main theme, the 
immortality of the soul.  
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which they have received from us’ (i.e., from the ‘barbarians’) (6.2.27.5). Here, the tenet given as 
an example is close, and its provenance identical, to that mentioned in 6.4.35.1: ‘From Pythagoras 
Plato derived the immortality of the soul (τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι); and he from the Egyptians’ 
(6.2.27.2). There are also further parallels.16 
Reading these passages together seems manifestly warranted: although their scopes vary in terms of 
the doctrines explicated, Clement shows consistency through concentrating on Plato and Pythagoras 
and the Egyptian origin of their tenets. It is also noteworthy that in all the passages where the ideas 
appropriated are explicitly extolled, there is a reference to a claim by the philosophers themselves.17 
Str. 6.4.35.1 is, however, exceptional in two respects. First, Clement’s openness in evaluating the 
tenet of reincarnation is not matched anywhere in his surviving writings. Second, I have found only 
one scholarly comment on Clement’s evaluation of the doctrine in this passage. Theodor Zahn 
mentions it as one of the two passages (along with Str. 4.12.85.3) to support his conclusion that, in 
spite of rejecting reincarnation, Clement did find the doctrine ‘very much worth consideration’.18 
 
16 In Str. 1.15.66.3, Clement writes, ‘Plato does not deny importing from abroad (ἐμπορεύεσθαι) the 
best parts into his philosophy (τὰ κάλλιστα εἰς φιλοσοφίαν), and admits a visit to Egypt’. A little 
later, in 1.16.68.2, we read, ‘Plato’s continual respect for non-Greeks is clearly revealed: he recalls 
that he, like Pythagoras, learned the majority of his finest theories (τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ γενναιότατα τῶν 
δογμάτων) among foreigners (ἐν βαρβάροις)’. 
17 I cannot in the present context delve into the question of how to decide if this reflects Clement’s 
intention to distance himself from the tenets praised, or his desire to make his own endorsement 
thereof a little more difficult to detect. 
18 I.e., ‘sehr der Erwägung werth’. Theodor Zahn, Supplementum Clementinum, Geschichte des 
neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Literatur 3 (Erlangen, 1884), 143. 
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The only things on which other scholars have commented are the (implausible) Egyptian origin of 
the tenet and the Greeks’ alleged tendency to plagiarize.19  
This passage is the crowning example of the kind of evidence that a theory of Clement’s rejection 
of reincarnation is unable to explain. And yet Str. 6.4.35.1 alone comes nowhere near being the 
answer to the main question concerning Clement’s position on reincarnation. It is a single passage 
in a work that essentially only survives in a single manuscript.20 Moreover, as it locates 
reincarnation in a history-of-ideas context, it does not show how reincarnation ties up with 
Clement’s thought more broadly. 
 
Pre-existence and Concealment 
In book 4 of Str., we find a passage that has a bearing on Clement’s thought in several areas. It is 
also one that has been used by several scholars to deny Clement’s belief in one of the key 
 
19 Alexander Alexakis, ‘Was There Life beyond the Life Beyond? Byzantine Ideas on Reincarnation 
and Final Restoration’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 55 (2001), 155–77, 159; P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, 
Trial (2019), 122; Guilluame Ducoeur, ‘Palingénésie indienne et métensomatose basilidienne chez 
Clément d’Alexandrie (Stromates 3.7 et 4.12)’, in Guillame Ducoeur and Claire Muckensturm-
Poulle (eds), La transmigration des âmes en Grèce et en Inde anciennes (Besançon, 2016), 93–105, 
98–9; and (on plagiarism) Jean Daniélou, Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes avant Nicée: 2, 
Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles (Tournai, 1961), 64, 70–1. 
Herodotus’s report (2.123) that the Egyptians were the first to believe in reincarnation is usually 
considered to be without foundation. 





prerequisites of reincarnation, the pre-existence of the soul.21 The broader context is the relationship 
between the soul and the body, and this is what Clement says: ‘The soul is not, then, sent here down 
from heaven to what is worse. For God works all things up to what is better. But the soul which has 
chosen the best life – the life that is from God and righteousness – exchanges earth for heaven’ (Str. 
4.26.167.4).22 
This is an example of a phenomenon I have encountered in at least two other passages: Clement 
couples reincarnation or pre-existence with some other notion that he then proceeds to denounce – 
creating (at least for some of his readers) the impression he rejects them both, even though the link 
between the ideas is not inevitable. In Str. 4.26, the actual target of criticism is the idea that God 
could be the cause of any kind of deterioration. No, says Clement, God ‘works all things up to what 
is better’. I see this passage in the context of Clement’s repeated affirmations that this world is good 
 
21 Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 
1886 (Oxford, 1913), 107; Jean Hering, Étude sur la doctrine de la chute et de la préexistence des 
âmes (Paris, 1923), 31; A. Knauber, ‘Die patrologische Schätzung des Clemens von Alexandrien 
bis zu seinem neuerlichen Bekanntwerden durch die ersten Druckeditionen des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in 
Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann (eds), Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten (Münster, 
1970), 280–308, 302; Peter Lee, ‘Reincarnation and the Christian Tradition’, The Modern 
Churchman 23 (1980), 103–17, 108; Monika Recinová, ‘Clement’s Angelological Doctrines: 
Between Jewish Models and Philosophic-Religious Streams of Late Antiquity’, in Matyáš Havrda, 
Vit Hušek and Jana Plátová (eds) Seventh Book of the Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium 
on Clement of Alexandria (Olomouc, October 21-23, 2010), VigChrSup 117 (Leiden, 2012), 94–
111, 97. 
22 The translations from Str. 4–7 and Ecl. are Wilson’s in ANF (with modifications). See Str. 
3.14.94.2–3 for a similar thought. 
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and that ending up here is not a terrible thing (i.e., birth is not evil), but even a cause for 
thankfulness (Str. 4.26.166.1). However, we should bless our departure, ‘receiving with great joy 
the dwelling place in heaven’ (ibid.). Put simply, earth is good but heaven better. 
In a similar fashion, reincarnation is contingently linked with the ideas – the real objects of 
Clement’s disapproval – that martyrdom is a punishment (Str. 4.12.83.2) and that reincarnation is a 
valid reason for vegetarianism (Str. 7.6.32.8). The fault with the former idea is that since becoming 
a martyr is dependent on one’s own choice, it cannot be providential – and a punishment should be 
just that. Clement in no way comments on the idea, which he attributes to Basilides, that there are 
sins of previous lives. The latter idea, reincarnation as a reason for vegetarianism, would make no 
sense for Clement, as there are no hints that he accepted the possibility that a human soul could be 
born in an animal body. In Str. 7.6, he is speaking of the Pythagoreans’ ‘dreaming 
(ὀνειροπολοῦντες) about the confinement of the soul in another body’. In its only other occurrence 
in Clement (Paed. 2.10.106), the verb ὀνειροπολέω (‘to dream’) clearly has the implied meaning, 
‘to have a wrong conception of’, and since this would make perfect sense in Str. 7.6.32.8 as well, 
the claim that Clement here ‘openly rejects’ reincarnation is highly problematic.23 
To take one more example, let us turn to Str. 3.13.93.3: ‘But our brilliant friend takes a more 
Platonic view (ἡγεῖται δὲ ὁ γενναῖος οὗτος Πλατωνικώτερον) and says the soul is divine in origin 
and has come from above to our world of birth and decay after being made effeminate by desire’. 
The man in question is Julius Cassian, whose interpretation of a passage in an apocryphal gospel 
Clement is assessing. He uses a threefold μέν–δέ–δέ structure; the cited statement is under the 
second δέ and thus represents a counterpoint to the previous one about the interpretation of the 
gospel passage: there Cassian is wrong – he ‘does not seem to recognize’ what Clement thinks is 
 
23 The quotation is from Jennifer Otto, ‘Philo, Judaeus? A Re-Evaluation of Why Clement Calls 
Philo “the Pythagorean”’, SPhiloA 25 (2013), 115–38, 123. 
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the correct understanding (3.3.93.1–2) – but here he is ‘more Platonic’. Given Clement’s 
appreciation of Plato and his acceptance of pre-existence elsewhere, the most plausible 
interpretation of ‘more Platonic’ is ‘more correct’. No criticism of the idea of the soul’s pre-
existence is thus present. 
 
The Body and Resurrection 
In research literature, one of the things often emphasized in connection with reincarnation or some 
of its anthropological prerequisites in Clement is the appreciation he shows for the body.24 I 
concede that his attitude is more positive than Philo’s, but what are the implications of this for 
 
24 E.g., Peter Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria, 
VigChrSup 43 (Leiden, 1999), 94: ‘Clement disliked the doctrine of transmigration as expressed by 
some philosophers. Transmigration implied that the soul was connected to the body simply for 
purification and punishment and that the body as material was evil, a theory that Clement rejected’. 
For similar statements, without an explicit reference to reincarnation, see, e.g., J. Daniélou, Histoire 
(1961), 376; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Shape of Death: Life, Death, and Immortality in the Early 
Fathers (New York, 1961), 141; John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement 
(Oxford, 2000), 141; Martin Pujiula, Körper und christliche Lebensweise: Clemens von 
Alexandreia und sein Paidagogos (Berlin, 2006), 150. It should be noted that Karavites does not 
give an entirely accurate picture of typical reincarnational beliefs prior or contemporaneous to 
Clement. In neither Plato nor Philo are purification and punishment original reasons for the soul’s 
connection with a body. For Philo (with occasional references to Plato), see S. Yli-Karjanmaa, 
Reincarnation in Philo (2015), 44–81. 
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reincarnation?25 To make a long story very short, the crucial question becomes: does Clement attach 
the body an ultimate value on a par with the soul? A priori this would be quite a feat for a 
Platonist.26 In other words, does Clement affirm ‘the final value of the human person as a unique 
composite of body and soul’?27 Does he say or imply that the human soul has a special, 
eschatological, relationship with one, and just one, physical body? He nowhere does. 
Instead, it is quite clear Clement subscribes to both the soul’s pre- and post-existence in a way that 
means that the body is not part of the human being in any ultimate sense. He calls the body a 
‘dwelling’ (Str. 4.26.163.2), a ‘shell’ (citing Plato without comment at Str. 5.14.138.3), an ‘earthly 
garment’ (Dives 3.5), a ‘tomb’ (citing Plato and Philolaus without comment at Str. 3.3.16) and a 
 
25 It should be noted that not even in Philo is the body evil per se. It is comparable to the physical 
world: the soul’s quest for liberation takes place in and from them. Only when Philo superimposes 
the dichotomy of good and evil onto the simplified anthropology of soul and body (ignoring the 
former’s internal structure) does he call the body evil. See ibid. 39–40. 
26 I am not using the term ‘Platonist’ to define Clement in an essentialising sense, but as a general 
characterization of his philosophical orientation. He shares the Platonic two-tier worldview where 
the physical body unavoidably belongs to the lower sphere of constant change and impermanence. 
See, e.g., Str. 5.1.7.5: ‘For, bound in this earthly body, we apprehend the objects of sense by means 
of the body; but we grasp intellectual objects by means of the logical faculty itself. But if one 
expects to apprehend all things by the senses, he has fallen far from the truth. Spiritually, therefore, 
the apostle writes respecting the knowledge of God, “For now we see as through a glass, but then 
face to face” (1Cor. 13:12). For the vision of the truth is given but to few’. 
27 Bradley Malkovsky, ‘Belief in Reincarnation and Some Unresolved Questions in Catholic 
Eschatology’, Religions 8.9 (2017), 1–11, 3 (speaking of Christianity in general), the lack of this 
value being ‘the problem with … reincarnation teaching, from the Christian point of view.’ 
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means to enter ‘the universal school’ of the world (Dives 33.6). The later dogma of the resurrection 
of the body is incompatible with Clement’s thought on anthropological grounds; the flesh is 
excluded from resurrection: ‘Then how can [those who claim to have already attained the state of 
resurrection] hunger and thirst and suffer (πάσχουσι) the flesh and all the other things which the 
person who has attained through Christ the fullness of the expected resurrection will not suffer (οὐ 
πείσεται)?’ (Str. 3.6.48.1-2).  
According to my observations, the term resurrection (ἀνάστασις) means several different things in 
Clement: an improvement in a general sense (Protr. 8.80) or as related to sanctification (Paed. 
2.4.41.4, Clement’s only reference to the ‘resurrection of the flesh’),28 the resuscitation of a dead 
body (Paed. 1.2.6.3), and a release from the body and the world. This last use is visible, e.g., in 
Paed. 1.6.28–9 where ‘after our departure from here’ is implied to be synonymous with ‘after the 
resurrection’.  
Although I do not think there are references to a belief in the resurrection of the body in Clement (a 
concept Philo never even hints at), there are some intriguing passages where he might be thought to 
approach the idea. E.g., in Paed. 1.9.84 he writes: ‘The all-holy Shepherd and Guide, the almighty 
Word of the Father … wills to heal/save (σῶσαι) my body by clothing it with the cloak of 
immortality’. Heal or save? In order not to argue in circles by appealing to Clement’s Platonic 
 
28 Based on the partial parallel in Str. 7.14.87.2–88.3 and for reasons I will have to elaborate in my 
monograph, I take ‘the resurrection of the flesh’ in Paed. 2.4.41.4 as a reference to the improvement 
of the most ‘fleshly’ type of Christians. It should be noted that Clement never speaks of ‘the 
resurrection of the body’ pace, e.g., Brian E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of 
Patristic Eschagoloty (Cambridge, 1991), 46; M. Recinová, ‘Angelological’ (2012), 109–10. The 




orientation, I base my preference of the translation ‘heal’ on what Clement says twice just a little 
before, in 1.9.83: ‘We need the Saviour (σωτῆρος) because we are sick (νοσοῦντες) in our lives 
from the reprehensible lusts’. This, I believe, represents the healing, sanctification and even 
resurrection that concerns the body: using it free from the passions. Another example: ‘Those who 
serve the heavenly court, that of the King of all, sanctify the flesh, the untainted garment of the soul, 
and clothe it with incorruption’ (Paed. 2.10.109.3).29 There is no eschatology here: all the verbs are 
in the present tense; ‘incorruption’ refers to this earthly life and has an ethical content.30 This is 
easy to see when we compare the passage to Paed. 2.10.100.2–3 where Clement interprets Paul’s 
statement in 1Cor. 15:53 (putting on incorruption) as learning self-control in this life with the result 
that ‘we are living’ (διώκομεν, present tense again) a life like that of angels. 
Clement shares Philo’s ideal of alienation from this world, although perhaps in a somewhat milder 
form.31 In Str. 4.13.94.2–3, he sets out his view in a lucid manner. He first exposes the wrong way 
of thinking: ‘the things desired are [not] alien in the way those suppose who teach that the creator is 
different from the first God, nor because birth is abominable and evil. For such opinions are 
impious’. He then tells his readers the real reason: ‘But we say that the things of the world are alien, 
not as if they were foul, nor as if they did not belong to God, the Lord of the universe, but because 
we do not remain with them for ever’.  
 
29 Translations from Paed. are Wood’s in The Fathers of the Church with occasional modifications. 
30 See meanings I.3 (e.g., ‘corrupt’, ‘pervert’) and II.3 (‘to be morally corrupted’) of φθέίρω in LSJ.  
31 See, e.g., Conf. 77–82 where Philo explains how ‘all whom Moses calls wise are represented as 
sojourners’ in the Pentateuch: Abraham, Jacob and Isaac were merely visiting a world that was not 
their true fatherland. Moses himself goes even further: ‘His tenancy of the body is not to him 
merely that of the foreigner as immigrant settlers count it. To alienate himself from it, never to 
count it as his own is, he holds, to give it its due.’  
16 
 
Things physical (including the body) are useful in this world: ‘The things that the Aristotelians 
maintain to be the three goods, those [the elect one] uses, including the body, like someone sent far 
away from home uses inns and the houses by the way’ (Str. 4.26.166.1).32 An intriguing question is 
if the plurals ‘inns and houses’ are an allusion to several bodies.33 Be that as it may, the ‘inns and 
houses’ possess only an instrumental value for the traveler. In Clement’s ethos we should not 
become attached to them, desire them and have passion for them, if we want to be saved. Clement 
writes in Str. 6.14.108.4-109.1: ‘So that when we hear, “Your faith has saved you”, we do not 
understand him to say absolutely that those who have believed in any way whatever shall be saved, 
unless also works follow. ... No one, then, can be a believer and at the same time be licentious; and 
though he quit the flesh, he must put off the passions, so as to be capable of reaching his own 
mansion’.34 Getting rid of the body will not be enough, because if we have passions left, we cannot 
 
32 My tr. for Ὅσα δὲ τριττὰ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ θέλουσι, χρῆται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ 
σώματι, ὥς τις μακρὰν στελλόμενος ἀποδημίαν πανδοχείοις καὶ ταῖς παρ’ ὁδὸν οἰκήσεσιν. Wilson’s 
rendering is problematic: ‘He makes use of the things which the Pythagoreans make out to be the 
threefold good things. The body, too, as one sent on a distant pilgrimage, uses inns and dwellings 
by the way’. He confuses the Peripatetics with the Pythagoreans and makes the body a guest in inns, 
whereas it is itself an inn.  
33 A factor in favour of an affirmative answer is that as the three goods meant are those of the soul, 
of the body, and external goods (see, e.g., Aristotle, EN 1098b13–5), the metaphor of ‘someone 
being sent far away from home’ cannot concern all of them (for Clement would not present the 
goods of the soul as instrumental), but the body specifically. 
34 Stählin prints in his main text an emendation by Mayor: ἀλλὰ κἂν <μὴ> ἐξέλθῃ τὴν σάρκα, and 
appeals to Str. 6.9.75.3. Granted, there the gnostic ‘has withdrawn his soul from the passions’ 
before death, but that is hardly compelling. More importantly, to what kind of situation could the 
expression ‘though he does not quit the flesh’ refer? It is certainly not synonymous with ‘even while 
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be saved. This is reminiscent of how Philo speaks of the mind’s inability to shed the lower parts of 
the soul along with the body at death as something that will lead to another incarnation 
(παλιγγενεσία, Cher. 114).35 
 
The Fate of the Wicked Souls 
What, then, is the alternative to salvation in Clement? Both he and Philo are quite reticent when it 
comes to the afterlife. They do agree that there will be punishments for the wicked.36 Ramelli has 
argued that we can discern the idea of universal salvation or apokatastasis in Clement and that the 
punishments he envisages are remedial.37 I think this is accurate.38 But Clement never details the 
 
being alive’; the aorist ἐξέλθῃ points to a sudden event, not a state. This would be understandable if, 
say, the possible consequences of an illness were being discussed, but there is nothing in the context 
that would make the emendation sensible, let alone necessary.  
35 My interpretation of the passage, based on the analysis in S. Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in 
Philo (2015), 150–67. 
36 For Philo, see, e.g., Praem. 69: ‘For people think that death is the termination of punishment but 
in the divine court it is hardly the beginning’. Yet he denies the existence of a mythical underworld, 
taking Hades and Tartarus as references to the life of the wicked soul in the body (Congr. 57, 59; 
QG 4.234, QE 2.40). 
37 Ilaria Ramelli, ‘Stromateis VII and Clement’s Hints at the Theory of Apokatastasis’, in M. 
Havrda, V. Hušek and J. Plátová, The Seventh Book (2012), 244–5; ead., The Christian Doctrine of 
Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, VigChrSup 120 
(Leiden, 2013), 119–36. 
38 See, e.g., Str. 6.6.46.3 where Clement adopts the view that ‘all who believe shall be saved, 
although they may be of the Gentiles, on making their profession there; since God’s punishments 
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punishments post mortem. He more than once refers to them with the help of Greek thought in a 
way that can be interpreted to allude to reincarnation. In Str. 5.14.90–1 he once again returns to the 
theme of the Greeks’ ‘pilfer[ing ideas] from the barbarian philosophy’, and now says this about 
‘punishments after death’ and ‘penal retribution by fire’. His proof texts come from the 
reincarnational, concluding myth of Plato’s Republic. He first quotes from and compares 615e–
616a39 with Ps 104:1 (LXX 103:1), and then continues: ‘Well, did not Plato know of the rivers of 
fire and the depth of the earth, and Tartarus … introducing such corrective tortures for discipline? 
… He shrinks not from writing, “When all the souls had chosen their lives, according to the draw 
they approached Lachesis in order and she gave each the daimon they had chosen to escort them as 
protector through their lives and as fulfiller of their choices” (Rep. 620d-e40 ) (Str. 5.14.91.2–4)’.  
Here Clement quotes from Plato part of an explicit description the process of reincarnation – 
without comment. Had he considered reincarnation a ‘dangerous virus’,41 we would be left 
 
are saving and disciplinary, leading to conversion, and choosing rather the repentance than the death 
of a sinner; and especially since souls, although darkened by passions, when released from their 
bodies, are able to perceive more clearly, because of their being no longer obstructed by the paltry 
flesh’. See also Str. 7.10.56.3. 
39 The section deals with the prevention of the incurably wicked souls from emerging from the 
underworld and proceeding to reincarnation. 
40 Trans. Emlyn-Jones & Preddy in Loeb Classical Library. 
41 P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, Trial (2010), 162. This is his general characterization of the things of 
which Photius accused Clement. Ashwin-Siejkowski notes the ‘absence of criticism’ of 
reincarnation in Clement (p. 120), but he nevertheless considers it proven that ‘Clement did not 
subscribe to the theory of incarnation (sic) in any shape or form’ (p. 123). 
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wondering why he utters no word of criticism; indeed, why he quotes such a passage in the first 
place. 
A similar case meets us in Str. 4.7.44. Clement chastises those who do not understand martyrdom 
for ‘not knowing that such a gate of death is the beginning of the true life; and they will understand 
neither the honours after death, which belong to those who have lived holily (ὁσίως βεβιωκότων, 
from Phaedo 113d, 114b), nor the punishments of those who have lived unrighteously and 
impurely’. He again brings up the agreement between ‘our scriptures’ and Greek thinkers, first 
quoting the Pythagorean Theano (fr. 201 Thesleff) to the effect that the wicked would be lucky if 
the soul was not immortal. He then cites Plato’s words in the Phaedo: ‘“For if death were release 
from everything” and so forth. We are not then to think according to the Telephus of Aeschylus 
“that a single path leads to Hades”’. The first quotation comes from 107c, the second, from 108a. 
What Clement’s ‘and so forth’ represents contains one of the dialogue’s direct references to 
reincarnation: ‘another guide conveys [the souls of the dead] back here after many long periods of 
time’ (107e). In my estimation, this at the very least amounts to flirting with the idea of 
reincarnation – for, surely, Clement had to reckon with the possibility that some, if not most people, 
in his audience knew the dialogue and the contents of the omitted text. Why did he not try to 
influence the conclusions that such people would draw? He could easily have remarked something 
like ‘After some nonsense, Plato continues …’ 
In both Plato and Philo, reincarnation is often portrayed as a result of the soul’s desires. The soul 
gets what it wants – another chance to mix with things corporeal and to enjoy sense pleasures. In 
this respect Dives 16.3–17.1 is quite interesting. Clement juxtaposes two attitudes towards riches. 
The right one makes its possessor ‘a ready inheritor of the kingdom of heaven’. The worse 
alternative is this: 
He who carries his wealth in his soul, and in place of God’s spirit carries in his heart 
gold or an estate, who is always extending his possession without limit, and is 
continually on the lookout for more, whose eyes are turned downwards and who is 
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fettered by the snares of the world, who ‘is earth’ and destined to ‘depart to earth’ 
(Gen. 3:19) – how can he desire and meditate on the kingdom of heaven? A man that 
bears about not a heart, but an estate or a mine, will he not perforce be found among 
these things on which he fixed his choice (ἐν τούτοις εὑρεθησόμενος ἐπάναγκες [ἐν] 
οἷς εἵλετο)? ‘For where the mind of a man is, there is his treasure also’ (Matt. 
6:21/Luke 12:34). (Dives 17.1)42 
Clement seems to be describing two alternative fates in the afterlife: inheriting heaven or being 
forced among one’s objects of desire: riches.43 In my view, the punishment of the worldly soul, 
ending up among riches, is very awkward – except as a description of what happens to it in its next 
life: its ‘slave[ry to] its possessions’ (Dives 16.3) will continue and it will ‘hardly enter the 
kingdom’ (18.1).44 In this context, it is warranted to note Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 3:19 in QG 1.51 
and especially Leg. 3.252–3. In answering the question of what it means for the soul to return to 
earth, Philo invokes what I have termed the ‘corporealization of the mind’: the νοῦς becomes so 
corporeally orientated that it is ‘ranked with things earthly and incohesive’ (Leg. 3.252). It is 
striking that Clement, like Philo, restricts the ‘departing to earth’ to apply to the wicked souls only, 
which is not very easy to understand without assuming reincarnation. Philo reinforces the presence 
 
42 Trans. Butterworth in Loeb Classical Library. 
43 In my view, the afterlife is implied by two factors: (1) Inheriting the kingdom of heaven can fully 
take place only after death, and, perhaps more importantly, (2) the context of Gen 3:19 is physical 
death. 
44 The impact of the soul’s inclinations on its following embodiment is a standard feature of the 
Platonic reincarnation scheme. See, e.g., Republic 620a: ‘For the majority of choices [of next lives; 
see the quotation at n. 40] were made through familiarity with their previous existence’. On this 
theme in Plato and Philo, see S. Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo (2015), 139–40. 
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of reincarnation by quoting the biblical text in a form that is more naturally interpreted to mean that 
the deplorable existence of the fool lasts as long as, rather than until, he returns to earth.45 
 
Christ and Grace 
If souls atone for their own sins by undergoing curative punishments, how does Clement see the 
significance of the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus? Christ actually has several roles: a 
teacher (Ecl. 5–6) and a healer (Paed. 1.2.6), a model (Str. 7.12.72, Protr. 1.7), a mediator of God’s 
power (Str. 7.12.79), awarder of the prizes in the struggle against the passions (Str. 7.3.20) – and a 
saviour. His saving function seems to be related to his life (rather than his death), and the role of a 
model is prominent: 
As for us, O children of a good Father, flock of a good Educator, let us fulfill the will 
of the Father, let us obey the Word, and let us be molded by the truly saving life of the 
Saviour (τὸν σωτήριον ὄντως ἀναμαξώμεθα τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν βίον). Then, since we 
shall already be living the life of heaven which makes us divine, let us anoint 
ourselves with the never-failing oil of gladness, the incorruptible oil of good odor. We 
possess an unmistakable model of incorruptibility in the life of the Lord (ὑπόδειγμα 
ἀφθαρσίας τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχοντες τοῦ κυρίου) and are following in the footsteps of 
God. (Paed. 1.12.98.3) 
 
45 For QG 1.51 and Leg. 3.252–3, see ibid. 70–9, and for Philo’s soteriological interpretation of the 
Paradise story more broadly, Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, ‘“Call Him Earth”: On Philo’s Allegorization of 
Adam in the Legum Allegoriae’ in Antti Laato and Lotta Valve (eds), Adam and Eve Story in the 
Hebrew Bible and in Ancient Jewish Writings Including the New Testament, Studies in the 
Reception History of the Bible 7 (Turku and Winona Lake, 2016), 253–93. 
22 
 
If Jesus’ death and resurrection had a crucial soteriological significance for Clement, it is not very 
easy to understand why he left it out here. There are, however, also references in Clement to the 
efficacy of the blood of Jesus. E.g., in Ecl. 20 he writes: ‘Now the Lord “with precious blood (τιμίῳ 
αἵματι)” (1Pet. 1:19) redeems (ἀγοράζει) us, freeing us from our old bitter masters, that is, our sins, 
on account of which “the spiritual powers of wickedness” (Eph. 6:2) ruled over us. Accordingly he 
leads (ἄγει) us into the liberty of the Father – sons that are co-heirs and friends’. It is noteworthy 
that Clement again uses the present tense (to describe an ongoing process), in contrast to his 
referent in 1Pet. 1:18–9: ‘You know that you were ransomed (ἐλυτρώθητε) from the futile ways 
inherited from your ancestors … with the precious blood (τιμίῳ αἵματι) of Christ’.46 Clement 
explicitly quotes these verses (and 4:3) in Paed. 3.12.85 and explains them through another symbol 
of Jesus’s death: ‘Let us have (ἔχωμεν) the cross of the Lord as our boundary line by which we are 
fenced around and shut off (περισταυρούμεθα καὶ περιθριγκούμεθα) from our former sins’.47 Jesus’ 
death has a significance for Clement, but it seems related to the ethical question of how we should 
live in this world. 
In Paed. 1.3.7.1 Clement does invest Christ with powers that no doubt contribute to salvation: ‘Both 
as God and as man, the Lord renders us every kind of service and assistance. As God, He forgives 
sin; as man, He educates us to avoid sin completely’. However, forgiving sins is not the same as 
atoning for them – a sinner could be acquitted in a trial before ‘the judgment seat of Christ’ (2Cor. 
 
46 Trans. NRSV. 
47 In Str. 2.20.108–9 Clement says much the same thing, first citing Plato (Phaedo 83d) as saying, 
‘each pleasure and pain … pins the soul to the body’ and specifying that this happens to the one 
‘who has not separated and fenced off (ἀποσταυροῦντος) himself from the passions’. He proceeds 
to urge his audience to be ‘willing to release, detach and separate (which is what the cross means) 
your soul from merriment and pleasure in this life.’ 
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5:10, cited at Str. 3.8.62.1). I have not managed to find references in Clement to the idea of a once-
and-for-all atonement by Christ.  
Divine grace and reincarnation are not mutually exclusive ideas in the context of a synergistic 
soteriology.48 In Str. 7.7.42.4–7, Clement explains his ideas about the human contribution to 
salvation: ‘Nor shall he who is saved be saved against his will, for he is not inanimate; but he will 
above all voluntarily and of free choice speed (σπεύσει) to salvation. Wherefore also man received 
the commandments in order that he might be self-impelled (ἐξ αὑτοῦ ὁρμητικός), to whatever he 
wished of things to be chosen and to be avoided’. In Str. 6.12.96.2, Clement even goes as far as 
saying: ‘For it is of great importance in regard to virtue to be made fit for its attainment. And it is 
intended that we should be saved by ourselves.’ That this is, nevertheless, not the whole picture is 
made clear by passages like Str. 3.7.57.1–2: ‘Our idea of self-control is freedom from desire. It is 
not a matter of having desires and holding out against them, but actually of mastering desire by self-
control. It is not possible to acquire this form of self-control except by the grace of God’. 
 
Conclusion 
I think Photius was correct in considering Clement a believer in reincarnation. Moreover, I think he 
would have been able to reach this conclusion even without the Hypotyposeis, as the above 
evidence, mainly taken from the Stromateis and the Paedagogus, in my opinion, shows. That 
evidence includes an undeniably positive evaluation of the doctrine, citations from within, and from 
passages close to, Plato’s accounts of reincarnation and the use of reincarnational language – and all 
this without any criticism of the tenet. In a few passages, Clement does seem to want to give the 
 
48 See Philo, Ebr. 145: ‘For without divine grace it is impossible either to abandon the ranks of 
mortal things, or to remain steadily and constantly with those which are immortal’. 
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impression that he denounces reincarnation, but a close reading reveals that the real objects of his 
censure lie elsewhere. This supports the hypothesis that his position on reincarnation, one that he 
clearly has but is reluctant to openly express, is a positive and not a negative one. Furthemore, his 
silence is understandable given the contemporary rejection of the doctrine by other Christian 
authors. 
The idea of human souls gradually, in several lives, reach the state of being able to be saved by God 
is in harmony with Clement’s anthropology, even though his dualism is milder than Plato’s or 
Philo’s: the body and the world are good things, but getting out of them is even better. The key 
ethical goal in Clement of ridding oneself of the passions as a prerequisite of salvation also fits 
reincarnation thinking seamlessly. The same applies to his understanding of God’s punishments as 
corrective and to his universalistic soteriology. 
 
